Symmetry arguments against regular probability:  A reply to recent objections by Parker, Matthew W.
Symmetry	Arguments	Against	Regular	Probability:	
A	Reply	to	Recent	Objections	
	
Abstract	Three	arguments	against	universally	regular	probabilities	have	been	posed	based	on	examples	where,	if	regularity	holds,	then	perfectly	similar	events	must	have	different	probabilities.		Howson	(2017)	and	Benci	et	al.	(2016)	have	raised	technical	objections	to	these	symmetry	arguments,	but	their	objections	fail.		Howson	says	that	Williamson’s	(2007)	“isomorphic”	events	are	not	in	fact	isomorphic,	but	Howson	is	speaking	of	set-theoretic	representations	of	events	in	a	probability	model.		While	those	sets	are	not	isomorphic,	Williamson’s	physical	events	are,	in	the	relevant	sense.		Benci	et	al.	claim	that	all	three	arguments	rest	on	a	conflation	of	different	models,	but	they	do	not.		They	are	founded	on	the	premise	that	similar	events	should	have	the	same	probability	in	the	same	model,	or	in	one	case,	on	the	assumption	that	a	single	rotation-invariant	distribution	is	possible.		Having	failed	to	refute	the	symmetry	arguments	on	such	technical	grounds,	one	could	deny	their	implicit	premises,	which	is	a	heavy	cost,	or	adopt	varying	degrees	of	instrumentalism	or	pluralism	about	regularity,	but	that	would	not	serve	the	project	of	accurately	modelling	chances.				
1.	Introduction		 Many	philosophers	have	suggested	that	probabilities	(rational	credences,	objective	chances,	or	both)	should	be	regular	(Carnap	1950,	1963;	Kemeny	1955,	1963;	Shimony	1955;	Jeffreys	1961;	Edwards,	Lindman,	and	Savage	1963;	De	Finetti	1964;	Stalnaker	1970;	Lewis	1980;	Skyrms	1980;	Appiah	1985;	Jackson	1987;	Jeffrey	1992;	Wenmackers	and	Horsten	2010;	
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Benci	et	al.	2011,	2016;	Hofweber	2014).1		A	probability	measure	is	regular	if	it	assigns	probability	zero	only	to	impossible	events,	so	that	every	strictly	possible	event	gets	positive	probability.		For	a	probability	space	áΩ,	F,	Pñ,	this	is	represented	by	the	condition	that	P(A)	=	0	only	if	A	=	Æ.		Such	a	probability	measure	can	be	difficult	to	arrange,	especially	where	the	set	of	possible	outcomes	is	infinite	and	all	are	equally	likely,	for	then	the	regular,	non-zero	probabilities	of	these	outcomes	will	normally	add	up	to	more	than	one.		But	we	can	avoid	this	problem	if	we	allow	P	to	take	infinitesimal	values.		Then	we	can	assign	a	non-zero	infinitesimal	probability	to	each	outcome	in	our	sample	space,	and	these	need	not	add	up	to	more	than	one.2		The	desideratum	of	regularity	has	been	the	main	reason	for	introducing	infinitesimal	and	hyperreal3	probabilities.		Some	think	that	this	desire	for	regularity	is	a	naïve	mistake,	but	the	arguments	for	it	are	serious	enough	to	warrant	response.		(See	above	references.		Benci	et	al.	2016	reviews	some	of	the	main	arguments.)		Williamson	(2007),	Parker	(2012)	and	others	(Bernstein	and	Wattenberg	1969,	Barrett	2010,	Pruss	2013,	Benci	et	al.	2016)	have	given	arguments	against	regularity	based	on	the	fact	that,	if	regularity	holds,	certain	perfectly	similar	events	cannot	have	the	same	probability.		Howson	(2017)	and	Benci	et	al.	(2016)	have	recently	tried	to	refute	those	arguments.		Here	we	will	see	how	their	refutations	go	wrong.		(Thus	we	will	buttress	the	case	
against	regularity.)			
                                                        1	I	do	not	claim	that	all	of	these	authors	are	supporters	of	regularity,	only	that	the	particular	works	cited	at	least	make	suggestions	in	that	direction.	
2	For	uncountable	sample	spaces,	regularity	and	finite	additivity	already	require	infinitesimals,	even	if	the	probabilities	are	not	uniform.		It	is	easy	to	show	that,	for	any	function	P:	Ω	®	R+	where	Ω	is	uncountable	and	R+	is	the	set	of	positive	real	numbers,	there	are	finitely	many	ω0,	ω1,…,	ωn	Î	Ω	such	that	P(ω0)	+	P(ω1)	+…+	P(ωn)	>	1.	
3	Hyperreal	numbers	are	just	real	numbers,	infinitesimals,	and	the	field	they	generate.	
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We	will	review	the	three	symmetry	arguments	that	Howson	and	Benci	et	al.	criticize,	fleshing	them	out	in	certain	respects.		We	will	then	consider	and	rebut	Howson	and	Benci	et	al.’s	objections.		Both	Howson	and	Benci	et	al.	focus	on	the	details	of	formal	probability	models,	claiming	that,	once	Williamson’s	models	are	made	explicit,	his	error	becomes	apparent.		Benci	et	al.	claim	that	this	extends	as	well	to	Parker’s	argument	and	their	own	proposal.		But	we	will	see	that	the	technical	errors	alleged	by	Howson	and	Benci	et	al.	are	not	present	in	the	original	symmetry	arguments.4		Those	arguments	are	based	on	very	general	principles,	which	we	will	make	more	explicit	here,	and	which,	while	they	are	not	above	doubt,	are	not	beholden	to	the	technical	details	of	any	particular	probability	model.		Finally,	we	will	consider	what	stances	a	regularist	might	take	given	that	the	objections	fail.			
2.		The	symmetry	arguments	
2.1	Williamson’s	coin	flip	argument	Consider	a	fair	coin	that	is	tossed	infinitely	many	times,	at	t0	+	n	seconds	for	n	=	0,	1,	2,….		Let	H(1...)	=	H(1)	&	H(2)	&	H(3)	&…	be	the	event	that	every	toss	comes	up	heads.		Williamson	argues	that,	even	if	we	let	probabilities	take	hyperreal	values,	Prob(H(1…))	=	0.5		Since	H(1…)	is	strictly	possible,	regularity	fails.		The	crucial	step	in	the	argument	is	the	claim	that,	if	H(2…)	=	H(2)	&	H(3)	&…	is	the	event	that	every	toss	after	the	first	comes	up	heads,	then	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	are	“isomorphic	events”	and	therefore	should	have	the	same	probability.	Let	H(1)	be	the	event	that	the	first	toss	comes	up	heads.		Then,	
	 Prob(H(1...))	=	Prob(H(1)	&	H(2...)).	
                                                        4	Benci	et	al.,	in	a	sense,	even	misunderstand	their	own	proposed	argument	against	regularity,	for	they	present	it	as	a	parallel	to	Williamson’s,	and	in	misconstruing	Williamson’s	argument,	they	likewise	misdiagnose	their	own.	
5	Throughout	we	use	‘Prob’	for	functions	over	physical	events	and	‘P’	for	functions	over	sets	that	model	physical	events.	
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Since	the	coin	is	fair	and	the	tosses	independent,	we	have,	
Prob(H(1))	=	½,		Prob(H(1)	&	H(2...))	=	Prob(H(1))	x	Prob(H(2...)),	
and	therefore	
Prob(H(1...))	=	(½)	Prob(H(2...)).	
But,	since	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	are	isomorphic,	Williamson	claims,			
Prob(H(1...))	=	Prob(H(2...)),		
and	by	substitution,	
	 Prob(H(1...))	=	(½)	Prob(H(1...)).	
Since	zero	is	the	only	solution	to	x	=	(½)x,		
	 Prob(H(1...))	=	0.	
Thus,	a	possible	event	H(1…)	has	probability	zero,	so	regularity	fails.			If	this	argument	is	sound,	it	applies	equally	whether	the	values	of	Prob	are	real	or	hyperreal,	since	both	number	systems	have	the	same	first-order	properties	(those	of	a	real	closed	field),	including	all	the	properties	used	in	the	argument.6		
2.2	Physical	isomorphism		Before	we	review	the	other	arguments,	let	us	flesh	out	Williamson’s	a	little.		It	clearly	relies	on	the	following	assumption:			
                                                        6	Williamson	introduces	a	third	sequence	of	coin	tosses	in	order	to	make	his	point	more	vivid,	but	we	need	not	consider	it	here.	
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Isomorphism	Principle	(IP):		If	two	events	are	isomorphic	(in	the	relevant	sense),	they	should	have	the	same	probability.		Williamson	does	not	state	IP	explicitly,	but	what	he	says	is	suggestive:	
But	H(1...)	and	H(2...)	are	isomorphic	events.	More	precisely,	we	can	map	the	constituent	single-toss	events	of	H(1...)	one-one	onto	the	constituent	single-toss	events	of	H(2...)	in	a	natural	way	that	preserves	the	physical	structure	of	the	set-up	just	by	mapping	each	toss	to	its	successor.	H(1...)	and	H(2...)	are	events	of	exactly	the	same	qualitative	type;	they	differ	only	in	the	inconsequential	respect	that	H(2...)	starts	one	second	after	H(1...).			Thus,	the	fact	that	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	have	the	same	qualitative	physical	properties	seems	to	be	relevant	to	his	argument.			An	argument	for	a	version	of	IP	might	run	as	follows:			
(I) The	laws	of	physics	are	space-time	invariant.		(II) The	chance	of	an	event	is	determined	by	the	physical	laws	and	local					qualitative	circumstances.	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	Therefore,		(IP')		 	Two	events	that	differ	at	most	in	where	and	when	they	hypothetically	occur	(and	perhaps	in	matters	of	bare	identity	but	not	in	qualitative	features)	have	the	same	chance.		What	I	mean	by	(I)	is	just	that	the	laws	of	physics	are	the	same	in	every	place	at	every	time,	and	they	do	not	have	any	place-	or	time-dependent	features.		Whatever	the	laws	imply	about	the	outcome	of	an	experiment	is	the	same	no	matter	where	and	when	that	experiment	is	conducted,	other	things	being	equal.7		This	in	itself	does	not	imply	IP',	because	we	might	think	that	chances	
                                                        7	Notice	that	(I)	is	weaker	than	Galilean	or	Lorentzian	invariance,	according	to	which	the	laws	of	physics	are	the	same	across	all	inertial	reference	frames	(in	a	Euclidean	or	Minkowskian	space-time,	respectively).		Premise	(I)	is	just	the	claim	that,	given	one	such	reference	frame,	the	laws	of	physics	are	the	same	and	apply	in	the	same	way	in	each	part	of	that	one	reference	frame.	
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depend	on	something	other	than	laws	and	qualitative	circumstances.		But	if	(II)	holds	as	well,	then	IP'	follows	(barring	any	creative	concept	stretching).		The	above	argument	applies	directly	only	to	physical	chances	or	propensities.		But	according	to	the	Principal	Principle	(Lewis	1980,	1994),	our	credences	should	generally	track	known	chances,	so	we	should	also	assign	equal	credence	to	such	isomorphic	events.		Thus,	the	regularist	is	in	an	awkward	dilemma:		She	must	either	deny	the	standard	and	sensible	principle	that	physical	laws	are	space-time	invariant,	or	deny	that	chances	are	determined	by	local	circumstances	and	laws.		Neither	is	inconceivable,	but	either	is	a	weighty	consequence,	perhaps	too	weighty	for	the	a	priori	arguments	for	regularity	to	sustain.	There	is	another	possible	argument	for	a	version	of	IP,	based	on	the	premise	that	the	probability	of	a	conjunction	of	independent	events	should	be	entirely	determined	by	the	probabilities	of	the	conjuncts.		(This	is	close	to	what	Hofweber	(2014)	calls	conjunctive	local	determination,	which	he	rejects.)		Williamson	assumes	that	his	coin	flips	are	fair	and	independent,	so	the	individual	outcomes	all	have	the	same	probability,	and	this	reductive	premise	is	all	he	needs	to	conclude	that	Prob(H(1…))	=	Prob(H(2…)).		However,	I	doubt	that	this	is	what	he	has	in	mind.		If	it	is,	then	his	references	to	physical	structure	and	qualitative	type,	and	the	detailed	physical	circumstances	that	he	spells	out,	are	all	irrelevant.		In	any	case,	we	will	not	concern	ourselves	here	with	this	alternative	argument	for	IP.		
2.3	The	circle	argument	Williamson’s	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	are	conjunctions	of	infinitely	many	coin	flip	outcomes.		Another	argument	against	regularity	(Bernstein	and	Wattenberg	1969,	Barrett	2010,	Parker	2012,	Pruss	2013)	involves	a	disjunction	rather	than	a	conjunction.		Construct	a	set	of	points	on	the	unit	circle	as	follows:		Let	p0	=	(1,	0)	in	polar	coordinates,	i.e.,	the	point	on	the	circle	due-right	of	the	center.		Let	pn	+	1	be	the	point	(1,	n	+	1)	obtained	by	moving	one	radian	counter-clockwise	from	pn.		Then	let	C0	=	{p0,	p1,	p2,…}	=	{(1,	n):	n	Î	N},	and	let	C1	=	{p1,	p2,	p3,…}	=	{(1,	n	+	
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1):	n	Î	N}.		Notice	that	C1	is	a	rotation	of	C0	by	one	radian,	but	is	also	a	proper	subset	of	C0,	since	
C1	does	not	contain	p0.	Now,	let	us	choose	a	point	on	the	circle	randomly,	say	by	throwing	a	dart	at	the	interior	disk	and	tracing	a	radius	through	the	center	of	the	dart	shaft	to	a	point	on	the	circle.		What	is	the	probability	that	this	point	lies	in	C0,	and	what	is	the	probability	that	it	lies	in	C1?		We	can	model	this	experiment	with	a	probability	space	áS1,	F,	Pñ,	where	S1	is	the	unit	circle	and	F	an	algebra	on	subsets	of	the	circle	that	at	least	include	C0,	C1,	and	the	singleton	{p0}.		The	event	EC	that	the	point	chosen	by	our	experiment	lies	in	a	given	set	C	is	modelled	by	that	very	set,	i.e.,	Prob(EC)	=	
P(C),	where	Prob	is	the	chance	or	credence	of	a	physical	occurrence	and	P	is	a	function	on	sets	that	models	that	chance	or	credence.		Thus,	in	our	model,	the	set	C0	represents	the	disjunctive	event	that	the	point	chosen	by	the	dart	throw	is	either	p0	or	p1	or	p2,	etc.							Finally,	assume	that	P	is	rotationally	symmetric.		Then	P(C0)	=	P(C1).		But	by	finite	additivity,	P(C0)	=	P({p0})	+	P(C1).		Hence,	P({p0})	=	0,	contradicting	regularity.		And	as	with	Williamson’s	argument,	this	holds	whether	P	takes	hyperreal	values	or	only	real	values.	There	are	significant	differences	between	this	argument	and	Williamson’s.		Firstly,	the	circle	experiment	takes	place	in	a	finite	region	of	space-space	time.		It	is	just	a	single	dart	throw	at	a	finitely	bounded	disc	(or	in	other	versions,	a	single	spin	of	a	spinner,	or	a	quantum	vacuum	fluctuation).		Thus	it	avoids	Williamson’s	unrealistic	hypothesis	of	an	eternal	sequence	of	tosses,	in	perfect	rhythm,	of	a	single,	ever	unchanging	coin.		And	if	one	is	tempted	to	dodge	Williamson’s	argument	by	suggesting	that	space-time	invariance	only	applies	to	finite	experiments	and	not	to	temporally	infinite	sequences	of	events,	such	a	dodge	will	not	avoid	the	circle	argument.	Secondly,	the	circle	argument	does	not	rely	on	IP.		It	simply	assumes	that	the	distribution	is	rotationally	symmetric.		However,	this	is	only	plausible	if	a	dart	throw	or	some	other	
 8 
experiment	really	can	be	performed	with	a	perfectly	symmetric	distribution.8		Intuitively	this	ought	to	be	possible,	but	to	my	knowledge	there	is	no	standard	physical	principle	to	guarantee	it	in	the	way	that	space-time	invariance	(along	with	(II))	guarantees	Williamson’s	result.		It	does	not	help	much	to	appeal	to	empirically	confirmed	laws	that	imply	symmetry,	for	a	committed	regularist	will	claim	that	our	empirical	laws	need	a	very	slight	revision,	so	that	any	consequent	probabilities	are	adjusted	by	infinitesimal	amounts	to	make	them	regular.		Such	subtle	revisions	are	generally	compatible	with	observed	frequencies.		If	we	could	construct	an	example	where	the	symmetry	is	due	to	some	general	principle	rather	than	specific	laws,	the	regularists	would	not	have	such	an	easy	retort.		Parker	2012	attempts	to	construct	such	an	example	involving	quantum	vacuum	fluctuations,	but	the	success	of	that	example	is	debatable.9		So	an	uncontroversially	realistic	and	principled	example	is	yet	to	be	given	but	is	far	from	being	ruled	out.		Furthermore,	Benci	et	al.	hold	that	a	probability	theory	ought	to	be	able	to	describe	conceptually	possible	processes	such	as	a	fair	lottery	with	infinitely	many	tickets,	and	a	dart	throw	with	a	perfectly	symmetric	distribution	seems	at	least	as	conceivable	as	a	fair	infinite	lottery.10		So	if	we	need	a	probability	theory	that	makes	sense	of	the	infinite	lottery,	as	Benci	et	al.	claim,	then	we	arguably	need	one	that	also	accommodates	invariant	distributions.		But	the	circle	argument	shows	that	such	a	theory	cannot	be	regular.				
                                                        8	In	the	circle	argument	stated	here,	we	require	rotation	symmetry,	but	as	shown	in	Parker	2012,	there	are	transformations	of	the	examples	where	translation	or	reflection	symmetry	is	sufficient.	
9	The	example	relies	on	the	familiar	picture	of	quantum	vacuum	fluctuations,	in	which	virtual	particles	appear	and	annihilate	each	other	independently	of	observations.		Some	have	argued	in	another	context	that	such	a	picture	is	naïve	(Boddy,	Carroll,	and	Pollack	2016,	2017).		
10	It	is	not	obvious	that	a	fair	infinite	lottery	really	is	conceptually	coherent,	but	Benci	et	al.	take	it	to	be	so.	
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2.4	The	urn	argument	Benci	et	al.	(2016)	introduce	their	own	symmetry	argument	against	regularity,	intending	to	refute	it	and	thereby	illustrate	how	the	other	ones	go	wrong.		Their	argument	is	based	on	a	fair	infinite	lottery,	which	is	also	the	main	motivating	example	for	their	Non-Archimedean	Probability	(NAP)	theory	(2011,	2016;	cf.	Wenmackers	2011,	Wenmackers	and	Horsten	2013).		Their	argument	runs	as	follows:	
	 Imagine	an	urn	containing	a	countably	infinite	collection	of	tickets	and	a	mechanism	to	implement	a	fair	lottery	on	the	tickets	in	the	urn.				 In	situation	(1),	all	tickets	are	in	the	urn	and	we	denote	the	probability	of	winning	of	each	arbitrary	single	ticket	in	such	a	lottery	as	Prob(E1),	leaving	open	the	possibility	that	this	may	be	an	infinitesimal.		 In	situation	(2),	one	ticket	is	removed	from	the	urn	prior	to	the	drawing	of	the	winning	ticket.		There	is	one	competing	ticket	less,	so	the	probability	of	winning	of	each	remaining	ticket	is	Prob(E2)	=	 !!"	$%&'()*)	Prob(E1)	(renormalization).		Taken	in	isolation,	however,	situation	(2)	looks	exactly	as	before	the	removal	of	a	ticket,	which	is	situation	(1).		Because	of	this	isomorphism	between	situation	(1)	and	situation	(2),	we	find	that	the	probability	of	winning	of	each	individual	ticket	is	equal	to	Prob(E2)	=	Prob(E1).	…	Even	in	a	non-Archimedean	[hyperreal]	field,	these	equalities	can	only	hold	simultaneously	if	Prob(E1)	=	Prob(E2)	=	0.		(Benci	et	al.	2016)		Thus,	according	to	this	argument,	E1	and	E2	are	possible	but	have	probability	zero,	so	again	regularity	fails.	The		relevant	“isomorphism”	here	is	expressed	in	the	stipulation	that	the	new	situation	(2)	“looks	exactly	as	before.”		The	qualitative	physical	circumstances	are	the	same,	or	at	least,	the	argument	assumes	that	they	are	sufficiently	alike	that	the	probability	of	choosing	a	given	ticket	should	be	the	same	in	situations	(1)	and	(2).		If	we	like,	we	can	further	stipulate	that	the	remaining	tickets	in	situation	(2)	shift	so	that	they	have	exactly	the	same	states	as	those	in	situation	(1).		Then,	as	in	the	coin	argument,	IP	implies	that	the	probabilities	are	the	same.					
2.5	A	problem	with	the	urn	argument	Below	we	will	turn	to	Benci	et	al.’s	attempt	to	refute	this	argument,	but	let	us	here	note	a	problem	with	it	that	they	do	not	discuss.		The	renormalization	step,	according	to	which	Prob(E2)	=	 !!"	$%&'()*)	Prob(E1),	is	not	obviously	correct.		It	assumes	that	removing	a	ticket	increases	the	
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probability	of	being	selected	for	each	remaining	ticket,	but	this	need	not	be	so.		Removing	a	ticket	changes	the	physical	situation,	at	least	in	terms	of	bare	identities,	and	there	is	no	general	rule	that	says	this	will	change	the	probability	for	any	remaining	tickets.		If	we	assume	regularity,	it	does	follow	that	removing	a	ticket	increases	the	probability	that	the	chosen	ticket	will	lie	in	the	set	of	all	other	tickets,11	but	that	does	not	imply	that	the	probability	has	changed	for	any	
particular	ticket.		It	may	be	tempting	to	object,	“How	can	the	probability	increase	for	the	set	of	remaining	tickets	if	it	does	not	increase	for	any	individual	ticket?”		But	that	objection	presupposes	countable	additivity,	or	something	like	it,	and	proponents	of	infinitesimal	probabilities	are	already	willing	to	sacrifice	countable	additivity	(e.g.,	Benci	et	al.	2013;	2016).			One	might	think	that	the	renormalization	step	is	justified	by	conditionalization,	as	Benci	et	al.’s	later	remarks	(2016,	19)	seem	to	suggest.		Let	T	be	the	event	that	ticket	t	is	chosen	in	situation	(1),	and	U	the	event	that	a	different	ticket	u	is	chosen.		Since	the	lottery	is	fair,	Prob(T)	=	Prob(U)	=	Prob(E1).		Now	suppose	that	ticket	t	is	the	one	removed	in	situation	(2).		If	we	therefore	assume	that	Prob(E2)	=	Prob(U|~T),	the	ratio	formula	for	conditional	probability	gives	us		 	 Prob(E2)	=	$%&'(,	&	~/)$%&'(~/) 	=	 $%&'(,)!"	$%&'(/)	=	 !!"	$%&'()*)	Prob(E1),				which	is	precisely	the	renormalization	step.		But	this	assumption	that	Prob(E2)	=	Prob(U|~T)	is	not	obviously	correct	either.		Conditional	probability	is	commonly	used	to	model	situations	where	we	have	obtained	some	information	about	an	outcome,	such	as	the	news	that	ticket	t	was	not	chosen.		It	is	also	used	to	model	cases	where	we	adopt	a	policy,	e.g.,	if	ticket	t	is	chosen,	ignore	it	and	repeat	the	experiment.		But	Benci	et	al.’s	case	is	neither	of	those.		It	is	a	case	where	
                                                        11	Let	T	be	the	set	of	tickets	and	t	the	ticket	removed.		In	situation	(1),	the	probability	that	a	ticket	in	T	\	{t}	is	selected	is	1	–	Prob(E1).		Assuming	regularity	and	that	range(Prob)	is	contained	in	an	ordered	field,	1	–	Prob(E1)	<	1.		In	situation	(2),	the	probability	that	a	ticket	in	T	\	{t}	is	selected	is	one,	which	is	larger.	
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a	ticket	has	been	physically	removed,	and	again,	there	is	no	general	rule	about	how	that	will	affect	the	probabilities	for	the	remaining	tickets.		So	this	application	of	conditional	probability	is	unjustified.		Thus,	the	argument	that	regularity	contradicts	IP	in	this	case	is	incomplete.		However,	there	could	conceivably	be	situations,	perhaps	specific	selection	mechanisms,	for	which	the	renormalization	step	or	some	similar	move12	is	correct.		As	with	the	circle	argument,	such	a	situation	is	at	least	as	conceivable	as	a	fair	infinite	lottery.		But	regardless	of	whether	the	urn	argument	can	be	salvaged,	we	will	see	that	Benci	et	al.’s	way	of	countering	it,	as	with	the	other	arguments,	is	unsuccessful.	 	
3.	Objections	and	replies	
3.1	Howson’s	objection	to	Williamson	Howson	claims	that	Williamson’s	argument	fails	due	to	“a	confusion	about	what	he	calls	‘isomorphic	events’,	assisted	by	an	inadequate	notation.”		The	key	point	in	Howson’s	argument	is	that,	in	an	appropriate	probability	model	for	Williamson’s	example,	H(1…)	is	a	singleton	set,	containing	just	one	element	of	the	sample	space,	while	H(2…)	is	a	pair,	containing	two	elements	of	the	sample	space.		Since	a	singleton	is	not	isomorphic	to	a	pair,	the	events	are	not	isomorphic	and	the	argument	fails.		Howson	goes	on	to	consider	variations	on	Williamson’s	argument,	but	this	is	the	main	thrust	of	his	objection.	To	be	precise,	Howson	specifies	a	probability	space	á2N,	F,	Pñ,	where	the	sample	space	2N	is	the	set	of	all	countable,	one-way	infinite	sequences	of	zeros	and	ones	(such	as	á0,	1,	1,	0,… ñ),	F	
                                                        12	Benci	et	al.’s	renormalization	step	implies	that	the	probabilities	for	all	remaining	tickets	are	affected	equally,	i.e.,	multiplied	by	the	same	factor,	but	that	is	not	needed.		All	that	is	needed	to	complete	the	urn	argument	is	a	case	where	removing	a	ticket	multiplies	the	probability	for	some	particular	ticket	by	a	factor	other	than	one.	
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is	the	algebra	generated	by	the	cylinder	sets13	of	2N,	and	P	is	a	hyperreal-valued	probability	function	defined	on	F.		Williamson’s	event	H(1…)	is	then	modelled	as	the	set	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}	and	H(2…)	as	the	set	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ,	á0,	1,	1,… ñ}.		Note	that	the	elements	of	an	“event”	in	probability	theory	represent	disjuncts	in	a	disjunctive	description.		The	sets	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ,	á0,	1,	1,… ñ},	for	example,	represents	the	disjunction	([H(1)	&	H(2)	&	H(3)	&…]	or	[T(1)	&	H(2)	&	H(3)	&	…]),	where	T(1),	of	course,	is	the	event	that	the	first	outcome	is	tails.		In	general,	two	collections	are	said	to	be	isomorphic	if	there	is	a	bijection	between	them	that	preserves	all	relevant	structure.		In	algebra,	for	example,	an	isomorphism	preserves	the	algebraic	relations	between	elements.		But	the	sets	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}	and	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ,	á0,	1,	1,… ñ}	are	not	isomorphic	in	any	sense,	because	there	is	not	even	a	bijection	between	them.		Thus,	according	to	Howson,	Williamson’s	events	are	not	isomorphic,	so	his	argument	is	a	non-starter.		
3.2	Reply	What	Williamson	means	by	“isomorphic	events”	does	not	concern	“events”	in	the	jargon	of	probability	theory,	i.e.,	sets	in	the	algebra	of	a	probability	space,	but	physical	events,	in	the	ordinary	sense	of	things	that	happen,	or	things	that	might	happen.		As	we	saw,	Williamson	is	concerned	with	“the	physical	structure	of	the	set-up”	and	the	“qualitative	type”	of	events.		Moreover,	he	explains	what	he	means	by	‘isomorphic	events’	in	terms	of	a	structure	preserving	map,	not	between	subsets	of	the	sample	space,	but	between	“the	constituent	single-toss	events”	H(1),	H(2),	H(3),…	and	H(2),	H(3),	H(4),…	that	make	up	the	events	H(1…)	and	H(2…),	respectively.		While	Howson’s	“events”	are	effectively	sets	of	disjuncts,	Williamson’s	
                                                        13	A	cylinder	set	is	a	set	{ás1,	s2,… 	Î	2N:	si(1)	=	v1,	si(2)	=	v2,…,	si(n)	=	vn},	where	i(1),	i(2),…,	i(n),	v1,	v2,…,	vn,	n	Î	
N.		However,	the	assumption	that	F	is	an	algebra	generated	by	cylinder	sets	is	unnecessary	here.		If	we	are	willing	to	relinquish	the	possibility	of	translation	invariance,	as	Benci	et	al.	are,	we	can	define	P	on	the	entire	power	set	of	2N.		But	the	particular	domain	of	P	does	not	pear	on	Howson’s	objection	so	long	as	it	includes	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}	and	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ,	á0,	1,	1,… ñ}.	
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“isomorphism”	consists	in	a	mapping	between	the	conjuncts	in	H(1…)	=	H(1)	&	H(2)	&	H(3)	&…	and	H(2…)	=	H(2)	&	H(3)	&	H(4)	&….		Furthermore,	Williamson’s	set-up	guarantees	a	mapping	of	the	conjuncts	that	preserves	qualitative	physical	properties	and	relations.		He	specifically	stipulates	that	the	coin	tosses	in	his	sequences	use	the	same	fair	coin	and	that	the	time	intervals	between	tosses	are	the	same.		We	could	go	further	and	stipulate	that	all	qualitative	properties	of	the	tosses	and	sequences	of	tosses	are	exactly	the	same.		Then	the	events	H(1…)	and	H(2…),	construed	not	as	subsets	of	a	sample	space	but	as	physical	things	that	might	happen,	are	indeed	isomorphic	in	Williamson’s	intended	sense.		On	his	view,	P({á1,	1,	1,… ñ})	should	equal	P({á1,	1,	1,… ñ,	á0,	1,	1,… ñ}),	not	because	these	two	sets	are	isomorphic	(which	they	clearly	are	not),	but	because	the	physical	events	they	model	are	qualitatively	alike.	Furthermore,	there	is	an	argument	available	that	such	isomorphism	ought	to	imply	equal	probability,	namely	the	argument	above	from	(I)	and	(II),	and	this	argument	appeals	only	to	the	physical	character	of	the	events-in-the-ordinary-sense,	not	to	the	set-theoretic	structure	of	the	sets	that	represent	those	events	in	a	particular	mathematical	model.		Whatever	model	we	might	adopt,	the	physical	argument	still	holds	sway,	so	far	as	its	premises	are	plausible.		So	Howson’s	set-theoretic	objection	misses	the	mark	by	a	wide	margin.	To	be	fair,	Williamson’s	use	of	‘isomorphism’	to	express	physical	similarity	shoulders	some	blame	for	this	misunderstanding.		An	isomorphism	is	normally	a	mapping	between	sets,	not	between	conjunctions	or	physical	features	of	things-that-could-happen.		Nonetheless,	the	intended	principle	is	clear:		If	the	same	experiment	is	conducted	under	the	same	conditions	at	two	different	times,	the	probabilities	of	the	outcomes	should	be	the	same.		Howson	seems	to	have	ignored	this	point	in	order	to	raise	a	technical	issue	that,	in	the	end,	misses	the	point.		
3.3	Howson,	the	circle,	and	the	urn	Howson	2017	is	concerned	only	with	the	coin	flip	argument	and	a	couple	of	variations	on	it,	not	with	the	circle	argument	or	the	urn.		However,	it	is	worth	noting	that,	while	Howson’s	critique	of	the	coin	flip	argument	misses	the	point,	it	does	not	apply	at	all	to	the	circle	argument,	
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for	there	the	sets	representing	the	physical	events	are	isomorphic.		In	our	model	áS1,	F,	Pñ,	the	physical	event	that	the	point	chosen	by	the	dart	throw	lies	in	C0	is	represented	by	the	set	C0	itself,	and	likewise	for	C1.		Since	C1	is	just	a	rotation	of	C0,	the	two	sets	are	set-theoretically,	topologically,	and	metrically	isomorphic.		But	the	circle	argument	does	not	rely	on	isomorphism	per	se.		It	uses	the	fact	that	the	two	sets	are	rotations	of	each	other,	and	assumes	explicitly	that	the	probability	distribution	is	rotationally	symmetric.		So	Howson’s	complaint	about	Williamson’s	argument,	that	the	sets	representing	the	events	are	not	isomorphic,	is	not	true	of	the	circle	argument,	nor	relevant.	Nor	is	there	a	parallel	of	Howson’s	critique	for	the	urn	argument.		There	the	event	of	drawing	a	given	ticket	is	naturally	represented	by	a	singleton	{n}	Í	N,	in	both	situations	(1)	and	(2).		Since	any	such	singletons	are	isomorphic,	the	set-theoretic	“events”	in	the	models	are	indeed	isomorphic	and	Howson’s	critique	does	not	apply.		Of	course,	the	fact	that	two	singletons	are	trivially	isomorphic	is	no	reason	that	they	should	be	assigned	the	same	probability,	but	the	urn	argument	does	not	rely	on	such	an	isomorphism	between	subsets	of	the	sample	space.		Like	the	coin	flip	argument,	it	turns	instead	on	a	qualitative	similarity	between	physical	situations.		So	here	too,	an	objection	along	Howson’s	line	is	both	false	and	irrelevant.		
3.4	Benci	et	al.’s	objection	to	the	urn	argument	Benci	et	al.	point	out	that	we	can	model	the	urn	experiments	in	different	ways,	and	while	we	can	equate	the	probability	of	E1	under	one	model	with	that	of	E2	under	another,	we	should	not	normally	compare	the	probabilities	given	by	two	different	models	or	interpretations.		“[C]hanging	the	sample	space	mid-game,"	as	they	put	it,	“is,	in	general,	not	allowed.”			Specifically,	they	suggest	modelling	situation	(1)	with	the	sample	space	N	and	a	hyperreal-valued	function	P	on	the	subsets	of	N	such	that	P({n})	=	1/α	for	each	n	Î	N,	where	α	is	
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the	size	of	N	in	a	non-standard	measure	(“numerosity”).14		Benci	et	al.	call	this	model	A	and	write	ProbA(E1)	for	the	probability	that	a	given	ticket	is	selected	in	situation	(1)	under	model	
A.15		According	to	them,	we	can	represent	situation	(2)	in	the	same	model	using	conditional	probability:		The	probability	of	selecting	ticket	number	n	given	that	some	other	ticket	i	has	been	removed,	they	claim,	is	given	by		
ProbA(E2)	=	P({n}|N\{i})	=	1/(α	–	1)	>	1/α	=	ProbA(E1).16			
So,	on	model	A,	the	probability	that	a	given	ticket	is	chosen	varies	from	situation	(1)	to	(2).	On	the	other	hand,	they	point	out,	we	can	also	represent	situation	(2)	by	letting	N	represent	the	remaining	tickets,	after	ticket	i	has	been	removed.		In	that	case,	a	natural	model	B	gives	the	probability	ProbB(E2)	=	1/α	of	choosing	one	of	the	remaining	tickets	in	situation	(2).		Thus,	ProbA(E1)	is	equal	to	ProbB(E2),	but,	according	to	Benci	et	al.,	A	and	B	are	two	different	models,	and	the	fact	that	two	events	have	the	same	probability	under	two	different	models	does	not	imply	that	they	must	have	the	same	probability	in	a	single	model.			Let	us	clarify	something	here:		Technically,	A	and	B	are	not	different	models.		They	are	two	names	for	the	same	mathematical	model,	with	the	same	sample	space	N	and	the	same	assignments	of	values	to	subsets	of	N	(or	at	least,	Benci	et	al.	do	not	indicate	any	difference	
                                                        14	Benci	and	others	(e.g.,	Benci	1995;	Benci	and	Di	Nasso	2003;	Di	Nasso	and	Forti	2010;	Benci,	Bottazzi	and	Di	Nasso	2014)		have	developed	an	alternative	theory	of	set	size	called	numerosity	theory,	where	the	size	of	an	infinite	set	is	not	a	Cantorian	cardinal	number	but	a	hyper-integer.		From	this	one	can	derive	a	fair	NAP	distribution	by	assigning	to	each	element	of	a	sample	space	the	hyperreal	probability	equal	to	the	reciprocal	of	the	numerosity	of	the	sample	space.		
15	Remember,	ProbA	is	not	identical	to	P.		ProbA	applies	to	physical	events,	while	P	applies	to	subsets	of	N.		If	we	let	lA	be	a	“labelling”	that	maps	physical	events	to	sets	in	N,	then	ProbA	can	be	understood	as	the	composition	P	 	lA,	i.e.,	ProbA(E)	=	P(lA(E)).		
16	As	noted	above,	this	is	not	obviously	correct,	since	in	situation	(2)	we	are	not	merely	conditionalizing	but	considering	an	altered	setup,	and	we	cannot	assume	countable	additivity.	
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between	the	functions).		However,	this	model	is	associated	with	two	different	interpretations	or	“labellings”,	different	ways	of	associating	physical	events	with	sets	in	the	model.		For	“model	A,”	each	natural	number	corresponds	to	one	of	the	original	tickets,	while	for	“model	B,”	each	natural	number	corresponds	to	one	of	the	remaining	tickets,	after	one	has	been	removed.		So	the	real	difference	is	not	between	two	models	but	between	two	labellings.		However,	Benci	et	al.’s	point	is	no	less	valid;	the	fact	that	two	events	have	the	same	probability	under	different	labellings	does	not	imply	that	they	must	have	the	same	probability	under	a	single	labelling.			Thus,	according	to	Benci	et	al.,	the	urn	argument	commits	an	oversight.		We	thought	we	had	shown	simply	that	Prob(E1)	=	Prob(E2),	when	actually	we	had	only	shown	that	ProbA(E1)	=	ProbB(E2),	for	two	different	labellings	A	and	B,	and	this	does	not	support	the	conclusion	that	regularity	fails.			
3.5	Reply	Benci	et	al.	are	quite	right:		The	fact	that	two	events	have	the	same	probability	under	two	different	labellings	does	not	imply	that	they	simply	have	the	same	probability.		However,	there	is	a	further	reason	to	think	that,	under	any	accurate	model,	the	probability	of	drawing	a	given	ticket	in	situations	(1)	and	(2)	should	be	the	same.		The	reason	is	that	the	qualitative	physical	situation	is	exactly	the	same	in	both	cases,	and	by	our	principle	IP,	the	same	event	under	the	same	qualitative	circumstances	should	have	the	same	probability.		Benci	et	al.	even	make	such	an	argument	themselves	when	they	write	that	“situation	(2)	looks	exactly	as	before	the	removal	of	a	ticket,….		Because	of	this	isomorphism	between	situation	(1)	and	situation	(2),	we	find	that	the	probability	of	winning	of	each	individual	ticket	is	equal”	(2016,	my	emphasis).		Yet,	when	they	come	to	their	reply,	they	ignore	the	premise	that	qualitatively	identical	events	should	have	the	same	probability	and	claim	instead	that	the	argument	trades	on	a	conflation	of	two	different	labellings.		In	fact,	their	own	presentation	of	the	argument	involves	no	such	conflation;	it	is	clearly	founded	on	IP,	and	as	noted,	there	is	an	argument	for	IP	from	more	basic	principles.		Given	IP,	any	model	in	which	the	probability	of	drawing	a	given	ticket	(other	than	the	one	
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removed)	varies	from	situation	(1)	to	situation	(2)	is	an	inaccurate	model.		Benci	et	al.	have	tried	to	show	that	one	can	construct	such	a	model,	where	ProbA(E2)	>	ProbA(E1),	but	that	does	nothing	to	refute	the	argument	from	IP	that	any	such	model	is	inaccurate.		
3.6	Benci	et	al.’s	objection	to	the	coin	flip	argument	 	Following	the	same	line	as	their	objection	to	the	urn	argument,	Benci	et	al.	claim	that	Williamson	conflates	two	different	probability	models	for	his	coin	flip	experiments.		They	again	refer	to	“two	models”	A	and	B,	which	are	actually	the	same	model	with	two	different	labellings.		In	model	A,	they	say,	the	sample	space	(or	more	accurately	the	labelling)	“reflects	that	the	count	of	events	starts	at	the	first	toss	of	H(1…)”,	while	in	model	B	the	same	sample	space	(with	a	different	labelling)	is	used	“to	reflect	that	the	count	of	events	starts	at	the	first	toss	of	H(2…).”		Let	us	make	this	more	explicit.		Define	labellings	lA	and	lB	so	that				
lA(H(1…))	=	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ},	
lA(H(2…))	=	{á0,	1,	1,… ñ,	 á1,	1,	1,… ñ},
lB(H(2…))	=	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}.		
Thus,	under	lA,	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	are	represented	by	the	same	sets	as	in	Howson’s	objection,	while	under	lB,	H(2…)	is	represented	by	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}	and	H(1…)	has	no	representation	at	all.		Now	let	P:	2N	®	[0,	1]*	where	[0,	1]*	is	a	hyperreal	unit	interval,	and	for	any	physical	event	in	the	domain	of	lΦ,	for	Φ	=	A,	B,	let	ProbΦ(E)	=	P(lΦ(E)).		Hence,		
ProbA(H(1…))	=	P(lA(H(1…))	=	P({á1,	1,	1,… ñ}),		ProbA(H(2…))	=	P({á0,	1,	1,… ñ, á1,	1,	1,… ñ}),	and		ProbB(H(2…))	=	P({á1,	1,	1,… ñ}).	
Now	Benci	et	al.	write,	
Williamson	exploits	the	intuition	that	ProbA(H(1…))	=	ProbB(H(2…)).		But	he	glosses	this	as	Prob(H(1…))	=	Prob(H(2…)),	thus	turning	the	probabilities	involved	into	
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evaluations	within	the	same	model.		On	the	other	hand,	Williamson	convincingly	argues	that	Prob(H(1…))	=	½	Prob(H(2…)).	…	The	two	glosses	indeed	contradict	each	other	unless	Prob(H(1…))	=	Prob(H(2…))	=	0.		But	the	contradiction	can	only	be	obtained	when	the	difference	between	the	sample	spaces	is	glossed	over.		(2016,	22)		In	other	words,	Williamson’s	claim	that	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	should	have	the	same	probability	is	founded	on	a	conflation	of	ProbA	and	ProbB.		
3.7	Reply	There	is	no	textual	evidence	that	Williamson	appeals	to	two	different	models	or	labellings,	even	implicitly.		What	Williamson	actually	says	is	that	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	should	have	the	same	probability	because	they	are	physically	isomorphic.		That	argument	does	not	depend	on	the	particular	model	or	labelling	employed.		Williamson’s	point	is	that,	in	any	accurate	model	of	his	proposed	experiment,	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	will	have	the	same	probability.		Thus	he	would	insist,	not	only	that	ProbA(H(1…))	=	ProbB(H(2…)),	but	also	that	ProbA(H(1…))	should	equal	ProbA(H(2…)),	or	else	A	is	just	not	a	good	model.		There	is	no	reason	to	suppose	that	this	is	founded	on	any	slide	or	conflation.		It	is	clearly	founded	on	the	principle	that	physically	isomorphic	events	should	have	the	same	probability,	and	again,	there	is	an	argument	available	for	that	principle.		Thus,	contrary	to	Benci	et	al.’s	claim	in	the	above	passage,	the	contradiction	can	indeed	be	obtained	in	a	single	model,	with	a	single	sample	space,	if	one	only	takes	seriously	Williamson’s	premise	that	physically	isomorphic	events	should	have	the	same	probability.	Later	in	their	paper	(p.	38),	Benci	et	al.	acknowledge	the	physical	basis	of	Williamson’s	argument,	writing,	“We	know,	one	might	say,	that	the	laws	of	physics	are	time-translation	invariant.”		Yet	they	then	complain	that	“it	is	still	not	easy	to	see	why	the	NAP	treatment	of	Williamson’s	scenario	has	to	violate	time-translation	invariance.”		Well,	the	reasons	are	straightforward:	
1. Any	regular	probability	model	that	assigns	probabilities	to	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	must	assign	a	larger	probability	to	H(2…).			
2. H(2…)	is	a	time	translation	of	H(1….).	
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3. Therefore,	any	regular	probability	model	for	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	violates	time	translation	invariance.	
4. All	NAP	models	are	regular.	
5. Therefore,	any	NAP	model	for	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	violates	time	translation	invariance.		QED.	
It	is	also	true	that,	given	a	NAP	model	that	assigns	a	probability	to	H(1…),	one	could	consider	a	different	NAP	model	that	assigns	the	same	probability	to	H(2…),	but	that	is	irrelevant.		The	first	model	on	its	own	must	violate	time	invariance	because	it	assigns	a	larger	probability	to	H(2…)	than	H(1…),	and	the	second	model	must	also	violate	time	invariance	because	it	assigns	a	larger	probability	to	H(3…),	the	event	that	each	flip	after	the	second	comes	up	heads,	than	to	H(2…).		Moreover,	if	we	want	to	understand	the	relation	between	the	probabilities	of	H(1…)	and	H(2…),	we	need	to	represent	them	together	in	one	model.		If	that	model	is	regular,	it	cannot	be	time	invariant.		
3.7	Benci	et	al.’s	objection	to	the	circle	argument	Benci	et	al.	rehearse	a	version	of	the	circle	example,	referring	to	Parker	2013	and	others.17		They	then	remark,	“It	will	be	clear	to	the	reader	by	now	that	our	diagnosis	of	the	argument	from	rotational	symmetry	against	infinitesimal	probabilities	is	structurally	identical	to	our	diagnosis	of	Williamson’s	argument.		Hence,	we	do	not	describe	it	in	detail	here.”	So	let	us	describe	it	in	detail.		The	diagnosis	of	Williamson’s	argument	was	that	he	conflates	two	different	probability	models,	or	more	precisely,	two	different	labellings.		Presumably,	then,	Benci	et	al.	would	claim	that	the	circle	argument	tacitly	appeals	to	two	
                                                        17	The	example	in	Parker	2013	is	suggestive	but	does	not	concern	probability.		Rather	it	is	used	to	argue	that	“Euclidean”	theories	of	cardinality	such	as	numerosity	(see	note	14)	also	violate	rotation	and	translation	invariance,	and	consequently	lack	certain	theoretical	virtues.		Parker	2012	gives	the	parallel	argument	against	regular	probabilities.	
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different	labellings	lA	and	lB,	such	that	ProbA(C0)	=	P(lA(C0))	=	P(lB(C1))	=	ProbB(C1).		Then	they	will	say	(if	the	diagnosis	is	structurally	identical	to	that	of	Williamson)	that	the	circle	argument	tacitly	switches	labellings	mid-game,	and	if	we	do	not	conflate	ProbA	with	ProbB,	there	is	no	reason	to	suppose	that	ProbA(C0)	=	ProbA(C1).			
3.8	Reply	In	fact,	the	circle	argument,	as	stated	here,	explicitly	assumes	that	there	is	a	single	finitely	additive	(and	possibly	hyperreal)	probability	function	P	that	assigns	values	to	both	C0	and	C1	and	which	is	rotationally	symmetric.18		It	follows	trivially	that	P(C0)	=	P(C1),	because	C1	is	a	rotation	of	C0.		And,	as	noted,	the	event	EC	that	the	point	determined	by	a	dart	throw	lies	in	a	set	
C	is	represented	by	that	very	set	C.		So	there	is	only	one	labelling	in	play,	namely	l(EC)	=	C	for	each	subset	C	of	the	circle.		The	argument	involves	no	conflation	of	models	or	labellings.		It	only	assumes	that	the	distribution	is	rotationally	symmetric,	and	hence,	that	a	rotationally	symmetric	continuous	distribution	is	possible.		In	the	dart	throwing	implementation,	this	amounts	to	assuming	that	it	is	possible	to	throw	a	dart,	or	construct	a	device	to	throw	a	dart,	in	such	a	way	as	to	yield	a	rotationally	symmetric	distribution.		A	dedicated	regularist	would	have	to	deny	that	such	a	strictly	symmetric	distribution	is	possible.		But	that	is	a	strong	claim	to	make	on	the	back	of	intuition,	conceptual	analysis,	or	theoretical	virtues.		It	is	at	least	conceptually	possible	that	some	perfectly	symmetric	set-up	could	produce	a	perfectly	symmetric	distribution.		Benci	et	al.	do	not	deny	this;	they	only	hint	that	the	argument	involves	a	conflation	of	two	different	models,	and	that	is	simply	not	the	case.	
                                                        18	Parker	2012	argues	contrapositively	from	the	assumption	of	regularity	to	the	failure	of	rotation	invariance,	but	again	it	is	explicitly	a	failure	of	rotation	invariance	for	a	single	probability	function.		Bernstein	and	Wattenberg	1969,	Barrett	2010,	and	Pruss	2013	also	discuss	invariance	for	a	single	probability	function.		Of	course,	Benci	et	al.	could	claim	that	these	are	all	careless	glosses,	but	there	is	no	need	for	such	accusations	if	the	arguments	are	taken	at	face	value.	
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4.	Next	moves	If,	as	I	have	argued,	Howson	and	Benci	et	al.’s	replies	fail	to	refute	these	three	arguments,	what	more	could	they	say	in	defense	of	regular	and	hyperreal	probabilities?	Howson	might	respond	by	pointing	to	a	merely	instrumental	role	for	hyperreal	probabilities.		He	writes,	
the	object	there	is	not	so	much,	or	at	all,	to	regard	hyperreal	probabilities	as	on	the	same	footing	as	real-valued	ones	but	to	use	the	nonstandard	universe	simply	as	an	aid	to	the	standard	theory	by	translating	standard	problems	into	nonstandard	ones	by	means	of	the	Transfer	Principle,	where	they	are	often	more	tractable….	(2016)		Consequently,	he	might	say,	proponents	of	hyperreal	probabilities	will	not	be	troubled	by	arguments	from	physical	principles.		However,	this	is	not	how	philosophers	typically	use	hyperreal	probabilities.		Hofweber	(2014),	crediting	Lewis	and	Skyrms,	defends	hyperreal	probabilities	on	semantic	grounds.		He	argues	that	a	chance	of	zero	just	means	no	chance	at	all,	and	if	something	has	no	chance	of	happening,	it	does	not	happen.		He	also	claims	that,	otherwise,	probability	would	lack	any	teeth.		For	such	reasons,	Lewis,	Skyrms,	and	Hofweber	accept	regularity	and	therefore	infinitesimal	chances.		They	do	not	use	infinitesimals	to	facilitate	calculations,	they	just	think	that	infinitesimals	correctly	represent	the	structure	of	chances	in	the	real	world.		Benci	et	al.,	on	the	other	hand,	champion	infinitesimal	probabilities	in	order	to	make	better	sense	of	what	they	consider	to	be	conceptually	possible	scenarios,	such	as	infinite	lotteries.		NAP	models,	they	argue,	have	theoretical	virtues	over	the	de	Finetti	(1974)	approach	to	infinite	lotteries	(which	is	essentially	just	to	drop	countable	additivity)	and	even	over	the	standard	treatment	of	continuous	sample	spaces.		To	an	extent,	the	possibility	of	calculation	is	one	of	their	concerns,	for	it	is	one	of	the	stated	motivations	for	their	generalized	continuity	axiom.		But	their	primary	motivation	is	not	to	simplify	calculations.		It	is	to	find	enlightening	models,	models	that	can	give	us	a	better	theoretical	handle	on	problematic	hypothetical	
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processes.		So	Howson’s	instrumentalist	view	of	hyperreals	is	not	in	line	with	the	philosophical	literature.	Still,	Benci	et	al.	seem	inclined	to	a	milder	pragmatism.		Some	of	their	discussion	suggests	a	general	antirealism	about	probability	models.		“[T]here	is	no	reason	to	assume,”	they	write,	“that	there	is	a	unique	best	way	to	model	certain	infinite	probabilistic	situations…”		Thus	they	might	counter	the	arguments	against	regularity	by	claiming	that,	even	if	the	space-time	invariance	of	probabilities	is	sometimes	mandated	by	plausible	or	useful	principles,	the	best	models	over	all	might	involve	an	infinitesimal	deviation	from	such	invariance.		Or	they	might	just	argue	that	it	is	useful	to	apply	various	models	to	a	given	process,	if	only	to	better	understand	the	space	of	possible	models	and	their	virtues	and	limitations.	Yet,	as	Benci	et	al.	themselves	point	out,	it	could	be	argued	that,	“There	is	such	a	thing	as	physical	chance.		And	it	is	a	legitimate	task	of	our	mathematical	models	to	track	this	property.”		Plausibly,	the	chances	for	a	given	experiment	have	a	definite	structure.		The	outcomes	in	any	sequence	of	die	rolls	or	coin	flips	exhibit	a	distinctive	and	robust	pattern,	largely	independent	of	the	detailed	circumstances	or	the	observer’s	conceptions.		It	is	one	of	the	main	goals	of	probability	theory	to	accurately	characterize	and	explain	such	patterns.		Benci	et	al.	respond	to	such	a	realist	viewpoint	as	follows:		
But	our	models	can	only	track	physical	chance	in	a	mediated	way.		In	order	to	describe	a	physical	system	and	its	behaviour,	our	probabilistic	models	have	to	select	a	sample	space	and	label	the	point	events	(that	is,	establish	a	connection	between	reality	and	point	events	in	the	model).		For	finite	sample	spaces,	the	labelling	does	not	matter;	but	for	infinite	sample	spaces,	different	labellings	can	result	in	different	probability	assignments.		All	this	induces	a	degree	of	relativity	in	probability	values	of	events.		(2016,	34)			Thus,	according	to	Benci	et	al.,	any	probability	model	with	an	infinite	sample	space	will	involve	some	arbitrariness,	whether	it	is	a	standard	Kolmogorovian	model	or	a	regular	one.		Their	main	concern	in	this	passage	is	arbitrariness	related	to	the	choice	of	labelling	and,	for	NAP	models,	the	choice	of	an	ultrafilter,	but	it	suggests	they	might	take	a	similarly	noncommittal	attitude	toward	the	choice	between	regular	and	space-time	invariant	models.			
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The	problem	with	such	a	stance	is	that	it	appears	incompatible	with	the	goal	of	accurately	modelling	physical	chances.		For	the	kinds	of	experiments	discussed	here,	a	model	cannot	be	both	regular	and	space-time	invariant.		If	our	goal	is	to	characterize	the	true	structure	of	the	chances	in	such	experiments,	we	should	take	into	account	whether	the	chances	are	truly	space-time	invariant	or	regular	(or	neither).		This	leaves	us	little	freedom	to	choose;	either	regular	models	are	accurate	or	they	are	not,	and	the	examples	discussed	here	give	us	some	reason	to	believe	that,	at	least	in	those	cases,	they	are	not.	This	brings	us	to	another	possible	position,	namely	that	of	a	moderate,	pluralistic	regularist	who	holds	that,	in	cases	where	there	is	a	strong	argument	from	IP	against	regularity,	the	latter	might	fail,	but	otherwise	it	should	hold.		However,	this	position	is	awkward,	especially	for	Benci	et	al..		Their	main	application	of	NAP	is	to	the	de	Finetti	lottery	with	an	infinite	number	of	tickets,	but	their	own	urn	argument	suggests	that	such	a	lottery	can	bring	regularity	into	conflict	with	IP	or	other	plausible	symmetry	assumptions,	provided	there	are	cases	where	something	like	their	renormalization	step	applies.		To	hold	this	pluralistic	regularist	position	would	mean	holding	that	infinite	lotteries	are	not	regular	when	the	specific	conditions	that	justify	such	a	renormalization	step	hold,	but	they	are	generally	regular	otherwise.		If	we	admit	that	regularity	is	false	for	certain	selection	mechanisms,	why	should	we	expect	it	to	hold	for	others?	We	can	make	this	point	more	concrete.		Suppose	we	have	a	lottery	machine	for	which	the	renormalization	step	is	valid,	and	suppose	the	moderate	regularist	admits	that	regularity	fails	for	this	lottery	machine.		Now	let	us	add	to	this	machine	a	component	that	detects	which	tickets	are	present	in	the	urn.		If	one	of	the	original	tickets	is	removed,	it	applies	a	different	selection	mechanism	for	which	no	such	renormalization	formula	applies.		For	this	composite	lottery	machine,	we	cannot	make	Benci	et	al.’s	urn	argument.		Will	the	moderate	regularist	then	claim	that	regularity	does	hold	for	the	composite	machine?		Surely,	if	the	composite	machine	applies	the	same	mechanism	as	the	original	machine	when	all	the	original	tickets	are	present,	then	in	that	case	it	produces	the	same	distribution	as	the	original	machine.		Thus,	such	opportunistic	
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regularism	is	in	general	untenable.		Similarly,	if	we	accept	that	there	are	realizations	of	the	circle	example	where	the	distribution	is	fully	rotation-symmetric	and	regularity	fails,	we	should	not	expect	that	regularity	holds	whenever	the	distribution	is	not	perfectly	symmetric.	What	this	illustrates	is	that,	if	indeed	we	are	concerned	with	accurately	modelling	the	structure	of	objective	chances,	then	the	question	of	regularity	turns	not	on	theoretical	virtues,	but	on	the	details	of	the	probabilistic	processes	under	study.		If	indeed	there	are	cases	where	regularity	does	not	hold,	then	(1)	there	is	no	sound	and	fully	general	argument	for	regularity,	and	(2)	regularity	is	not	needed	to	render	such	experiments	conceptually	coherent.		At	most,	regular	models	boast	certain	theoretical	virtues	while	lacking	others,	namely	those	of	permitting	invariance	under	various	transformations.		But	if	there	are	any	facts	about	the	structure	of	chances,	the	model	should	reflect	those	facts	first,	and	desirable	theoretical	virtues	only	as	accuracy	permits.		Of	course,	it	may	be	difficult	to	determine	what	the	most	accurate	model	is	in	any	particular	case,	but	if	we	have	good	reason	to	believe	that	chances	are	not	regular	in	certain	cases,	we	can	reasonably	hypothesize	that	they	are	not	regular	in	similar	cases	either.		
5.	Conclusion	We	have	reviewed	three	arguments	that	certain	hypothetical	experiments	exhibit	non-regular	probabilities.		If	these	arguments	succeed,	then	regularity	does	not	generally	hold,	and	there	is	little	reason	to	believe	that	it	typically	holds	for	other	experiments,	nor	that	we	should	demand	it	in	our	credences.		Howson	and	Benci	et	al.	have	attempted	to	refute	those	arguments,	but	their	refutations	fail.		Howson	points	out	that	Williamson’s	events	are	not	in	fact	isomorphic,	because	one	is	a	singleton	while	the	other	is	a	pair,	but	this	badly	misses	the	point.		Howson	is	speaking	of	the	abstract	“events”	of	mathematical	probability	theory,	which	are	sets,	while	Williamson	is	concerned	with	events	in	the	ordinary	sense	of	things	that	could	happen.		When	Williamson	says	that	his	two	coin	flip	sequences	are	isomorphic,	he	does	not	mean	that	they	are	subsets	of	a	sample	space	that	have	a	one-to-one	correspondence,	he	means	that	they	have	all	of	
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the	same	physical	qualitative	properties,	and	this	is	true	by	hypothesis.		Benci	et	al.	claim	that	Williamson	and	Parker	both	found	their	arguments	on	a	conflation	of	different	probability	models.		The	symmetries	between	Williamson’s	coin	flip	sequences	imply	that	they	can	be	assigned	the	same	probability	in	different	models,	but	not	that	they	must	have	the	same	probability	in	a	single	model,	and	likewise	for	Parker’s	point	sets.		But	neither	Williamson’s	nor	Parker’s	argument,	nor	even	Benci	et	al.’s	own,	is	in	fact	based	on	such	a	conflation	of	models.		Williamson’s	is	founded	on	the	principle	that	qualitatively	identical	events	in	qualitatively	identical	circumstances	should	have	the	same	probability,	and	Parker’s	is	based	on	the	plausibility	of	a	perfectly	symmetric	continuous	distribution.		Both	claim,	not	that	their	parallel	events	can	be	given	the	same	probability	in	different	models,	but	that	the	parallel	events	will	have	the	same	probability	in	any	one	model,	if	that	model	is	accurate.		This	is	no	mere	slip.	The	principle	underlying	the	circle	and	urn	arguments,	that	“isomorphic”	events	have	the	same	probability,	is	not	above	dispute,	but	we	have	provided	here	a	simple	argument	from	more	fundamental	hypotheses.		If	(I)	the	laws	of	nature	are	space-time	invariant,	and	(II)	chances	are	determined	by	local	qualitative	circumstances	and	natural	laws,	it	follows	that	qualitatively	identical	events	have	the	same	chance,	and	should	also	be	assigned	the	same	credence	insofar	as	rational	credences	track	chance.		One	who	insists	on	regularity	must	therefore	deny	either	the	space-time	invariance	of	laws	or	the	grounding	of	chance	in	qualitative	circumstances.	This	leaves	the	regularist	several	options,	including	at	least	the	following:		One	may	take	a	more	or	less	instrumentalist	view	that	is	more	concerned	with	the	theoretical	virtues	of	regular	probabilities	than	with	accurately	modelling	chances.		One	may	hold	that	regularity	fails	in	the	cases	discussed	but	is	still	plausible	in	other	cases,	though	we	have	seen	that	this	is	an	uncomfortable	position	to	hold.		Or,	one	might	simply	deny	IP,	as	well	as	the	very	possibility	of	a	symmetric	continuous	distribution.		Hofweber	(2014),	at	least,	prefers	the	latter	move,	and	denies	the	premise	supporting	IP	that	chances	are	determined	by	local	qualitative	circumstances.		But	if	regularity	requires	that	so-called	objective	chance	is	in	reality	such	a	
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contextual	matter,	or	that	the	laws	of	physics	are	not	in	fact	space-time	invariant,	then	the	arguments	for	regularity	should	be	regarded	very	skeptically.		
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